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THERE is a wholesome ring to the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the recently rendered case of Nor-
wood v. Baker. All courts who have had occasion to consider the
matter, have laid down the principle in general terms that special
benefits received were the only proper basis for special assess-
ments, and that the right to assess was limited to such benefit.
But not all have had the courage to apply the principle. In this
case, the question of the validity of an assessment of the whole
cost of an improvement, in proportion to the front foot, on abut-
ting proprietors, came up. The Supreme Court ruled that an
arbitrary assessment of that sort could not be supported; that
the system of assessment must provide a method of properly
estimating the benefits received. Otherwise, it violated the pro-
vision requiring due process of law.
Judge Harlan, in rendering the majority opinion, quoted
with approval the opinion in State, Agens, etc. v. Mayor of New-
ark, 37 N. J. L., that to the extent of the excess of the assess-
ment over the special benefit, it was an exercise of the right of
eminent domain, and was a violation of the constitutional pro-
vision requiring compensation for property taken for public
purposes. And also the language of the opinion in Hammett v.
Philadelphia, 65 Pa., as follows: "Whenever a local assessment
upon an individual is not grounded upon and measured by the
extent of his particular benefit, it is ro tanto a taking of his pri-
vate property for public use without any provision for compen-
sation."
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It also held that it was not necessary in order to support an
injunction against such a proceeding to establish the fact that
the special benefits did not equal the assessment; nor was it
necessary to tender an amount equal to the benefit actually
received; that as the proceedings did not provide for the ascer-
tainment of benefits that they were in their nature void; that
"the assessment was in itself an illegal one because it rested
upon a basis that excluded any consideration of benefits. A
decree enjoining the whole assessment was therefore an appro-
priate remedy."
It is a satisfaction to find courts ready to follow a gen-
eral proposition to its logical consequences. There is no
department of the law calling more imperatively for the protec-
tion of the individual against the action of the public authori-
ties than this of special assessment. The temptation is a strong
one to cast a burden upon the individual which should rest
upon the public.
Some tribunals have apparently acted upon the theory that
whatever the Legislature called a special assessment must be so
considered and that it must-be assumed that as the Legislature
can do no wrong, such special benefits must have been found to
exist, even where such an assumption violated the rules of
probability. It is not too much to say that by such methods of
construction the grossest extortion has sometimes been sanc-
tioned. Tribunals which are disposed to deal with questions of
this character in a spirit of timidity cannot quote the Supreme
Court of the United States in their support.
The Legislature may specify the district or property which
is to be assessed for benefits, but it may not decide by an
-arbitrary rule that the individuals in that district shall be
assessed a certain amount. The last question is in its nature a
judicial one, to be settled by some tribunal, not necessarily an
ordinary court, which has a right to hear the parties, after
notice and form its judgment after such hearing in each partic-
ular case. To quote the language of Judge Harlan: "It is one
thing for the Legislature to prescribe it as a general rule that
property abutting on a street opened by the public shall be
deemed to have been specially benefited by such improvement,
and therefore should specially contribute to the cost incurred
by the public. It is quite a different thing to lay it down as an
absolute rule that such property, whether it is in fact benefited
or not by the opening of the street, may be assessed by the
front foot for a fixed sum representing the whole cost of the
improvement and without any right in the property owner to
show when an assessment of that kind is made, or is about to
be made, that the sum so fixed is in excess of the benefits re-
ceived."
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